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EU countries closely regulate pharmaceutical prices whereas the U.S. does not. This paper shows how
price constraints affect the profitability, stock returns, and R&D spending of EU and U.S. firms. Compared
to EU firms, U.S. firms are more profitable, earn higher stock returns, and spend more on research
and development (R&D). Some differences have increased over time. In 1986, EU pharmaceutical
R&D exceeded U.S. R&D by about 24 percent, but by 2004, EU R&D trailed U.S. R&D by about
15 percent. During these 19 years, U.S. R&D spending grew at a real annual compound rate of 8.8
percent, while EU R&D spending grew at a real 5.4 percent rate. Results show that EU consumers
enjoyed much lower pharmaceutical price inflation, however, at a cost of 46 fewer new medicines
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1. Introduction 
European Union (EU) countries closely regulate pharmaceutical prices in various 
ways, while the United States (U.S.) does not. EU consumers clearly benefit because they 
often pay lower prices than U.S. consumers for the same medicines. But few government 
agencies or academic studies examine the less apparent costs of price regulation. One 
exception is Campa and Hernando (2004), who show that EU mergers of regulated firms 
produce significantly less value than mergers of unregulated firms. The EU also regulates 
the conditions for acceptable mergers and acquisitions. Aktas, de Bondt, Levasseur, and 
Schmitt  (2001)  and  Aktas,  de  Bondt,  and  Roll  (2004)  show  that  these  conditions 
negatively affect the firms involved.  
Our  paper  studies  how  EU  pharmaceutical  price  regulation  affects  EU  firms 
compared to U.S. firms, and the indirect costs to the EU. Although many pharmaceuticals 
are sold worldwide, EU (U.S.) firms typically sell proportionately more in the EU (U.S.) 
(see Vernon, 2005). The direct consequence of EU price regulation is that firms selling 
more  in  the  EU  could  be  less  profitable.  An  indirect  consequence  could  be  reduced 
research  and  development  (R&D)  spending,  fewer  research  jobs,  and  fewer  new 
medicines introduced by EU firms. 
The first part of this paper illustrates the average effects of EU price regulation on 
EU  firms  compared  to  U.S.  firms.  We  show  that  EU  pharmaceutical  firms  are  less 
profitable, spend less on R&D, and earn smaller stock returns than U.S. firms. The EU 
firms’  relatively  poor  profitability  and  stock  returns  are  consistent  with  Doukas  and 
Switzer (1992), who show that profitability and stock prices are positively associated 
with R&D spending. Reduced EU R&D spending and lower stock returns are costs borne   4 
by EU citizens because they imply fewer well-paid research jobs and lower wealth for 
EU stockholders. 
The strength of this analysis is that it illustrates the costs and potential policy 
implications  of  EU  price  regulation.  Although  policymakers  may  care  little  about 
pharmaceutical stockholders’ low returns, they may be interested in the negative effects 
that  lower  EU  R&D  spending  has  on  high-tech  employment  and  innovation.  One 
weakness of this analysis is that it compares average or aggregate figures for EU and U.S. 
firms. This obscures some of the effects of EU price regulations. For example, some U.S. 
(EU) firms could actually be more (less) affected by EU price regulations because they 
happen  to  sell  more  (less)  in  the  EU  than  in  the  U.S.  Indeed,  all  firms  selling 
pharmaceuticals in the EU are somewhat affected by EU price regulation.  
The second part of the paper examines the general effects that EU regulation has 
on pharmaceutical R&D spending by U.S. or EU firms. This issue could be studied easily 
if  most  firms  reported  sales  and  R&D  spending  by  geographic  area.  Unfortunately, 
relatively few firms publicly report sales by geographic area, and almost none report 
R&D  expenses  by  geographic  area.  Our  alternative  approach  relates  each  firm’s 
standardized sales to pharmaceutical price indexes. These indexes capture the level of 
price regulation in each geographic area over time. The relations between a firm’s sales 
and these indexes capture the relative sensitivity of its sales to changes in the indexes. 
Firm sensitivities are then cross-sectionally related to their average R&D spending. Firms 
with greater sales sensitivity to the EU (U.S.) price index are expected to spend less 
(more) on R&D.    5 
The notion that firms subject to greater price controls would spend less on R&D 
seems  straightforward;  however,  few  have  studied  this  relation.  One  recent  study  by 
Giaccotto, Santere, and Vernon (2005) shows that real U.S. pharmaceutical prices and 
industry-level  U.S.  pharmaceutical  R&D  growth  are  positively  related.  Our  results 
support theirs using firm-level data from both U.S. and EU firms.  
The last part of the paper estimates the costs to the EU of price controls over the 
last 19 years. We also project potential future costs for the EU, assuming that it retains its 
current  regulatory  environment,  and  for  the  U.S.,  assuming  that  it  adopts  EU-type 
regulation over time. Costs are estimated in terms of slower growth in R&D spending, 
fewer research jobs, and fewer new medicines. We estimate these costs with a variety of 
growth  models.  We  acknowledge  that  price  controls  provide  benefits  to  current 
consumers, but focus on costs because they have received less attention from researchers 
and policymakers.  
We  project  costs  for  the  U.S.  because  EU-type  price  regulations  are  gaining 
popular support. For example, many in the U.S. have called for large-scale reimportation 
of pharmaceuticals from price-regulated countries like Canada (e.g., Dorgan-Snow U.S. 
Senate Bill, S.334). Reimportation is an indirect method of price control which is similar 
to European parallel trade.
1 Other more direct forms of EU-type price regulation have 
been proposed in the U.S., including several provisions in President Clinton’s Health 
Security  Act.  In  August  2006,  California  legislators  passed  the  Prescription  Drug 
                                                 
1 Parallel trade is a more general term than reimportation because it refers to any product trade that occurs 
after the original manufacturer sells the product. For example, product manufactured in Germany, sold to 
an agent in Spain, and then resold by the agent in Spain to an agent in England is parallel trade. 
Reimportation fits the more common situation in the U.S. where a U.S. manufacturer sells to a Canadian 
agent, who then resells to another agent in the U.S. 
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Initiative, requiring manufacturers to discount pharmaceuticals by between 40 and 60 
percent for low-income state residents. 
Our results show that EU policy has kept pharmaceutical price inflation equal to 
average consumer price inflation over the last 19 years, with real costs of about $5 billion 
in foregone R&D spending, 1680 fewer research jobs and 46 foregone new medicines. 
Prospective long-horizon costs for the EU are estimated at between ten and 20 times 
these costs, with potential U.S. costs about twice the EU’s long-horizon costs.  
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the difference between 
U.S.  and  EU  pharmaceutical  price  inflation.  Section  3  compares  U.S.  and  EU firms’ 
profitability,  stock  return  performance,  and  R&D  spending.  Section  4  illustrates  the 
differences in U.S. and EU R&D spending growth over the 1986-2004 period using data 
on  U.S.-only  and  EU-only  R&D  spending.  Section  5  tests  the  relation  between 
pharmaceutical pricing in the EU and U.S. and R&D spending. Section 6 translates the 
observed slower growth of R&D spending into foregone R&D spending, fewer research 
jobs, and fewer new medicines. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.European and U.S. Pharmaceutical Prices 
  
EU pharmaceutical price regulations take various forms, and many countries use 
more  than  one.  Vernon  (2003)  describes  the  different  forms  adopted  by  each  EU-
member. Most European countries have stated that their pharmaceutical policy goal is to 
keep  pharmaceutical  price  increases  at  or  below  the  general  rate  of  consumer  price 
inflation. Although this goal is politically attractive, economic efficiency could easily   7 
justify real pharmaceutical price increases because pharmaceutical demand rises more 
than proportionately with income. 
U.S. pharmaceutical prices are relatively unregulated, but have not been immune 
to political pressures. In 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed a Health Security Act 
that  included  regulations  with  the  stated  purpose  of  keeping  pharmaceutical  price 
increases  at  or  below  average  consumer  price  inflation.  In  response,  21  large 
pharmaceutical  firms  pledged  to  keep  price  increases  below  average  consumer  price 
inflation, perhaps as a way to preempt direct regulation.
2  
  One  way  to  assess  the  degree  to  which  European  regulation  or  U.S.  political 
pressure  have  affected  pharmaceutical  prices  is  to  compare  real  pharmaceutical  price 
indexes for the EU and U.S. Figure 1 illustrates real growth of pharmaceutical prices for 
the U.S. and Europe from 1986 to 2004. For each year, the pharmaceutical price index is 
divided by the  consumer price index for  all items, and these real index numbers are 
compounded year to year, with 1986 as the base year.
3  
Clearly, European regulations have effectively kept pharmaceutical prices from 
rising faster than general consumer prices. Over the 19 year period, they never rose more 
than a few percentage points faster than general consumer prices. In contrast, U.S. real 
pharmaceutical prices increased in almost every  year. Real price increases moderated 
starting in 1993, around Clinton’s proposed price regulations (see Ellison and Mullin, 
2001). Prices also moderated in 2000 and 2004, just before the presidential elections. 
                                                 
2 The firms are Abbott Labs, Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Glaxo, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, 
SmithKline Beecham, Warner-Lamber Wyeth-Ayerst (American Home Products) Ciba-Geigy, Dupont-
Merck, G.D. Searle, Genentech, Hoechst-Roussel, Hoffmann-La Roche, Knoll, Marion Merrell Dow, 
Syntex, Upjon, and Zeneca. 
3 U.S. pharmaceutical and CPI (all items price 1982-84 =100) indexes are from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. EU CPI is from Eurostat Harmonized Indeces of Consumer Prices (all items). The EU 
pharmaceutical price index is from Eurostat starting in 2001 and compiled from OECD Health Data 2003 
for the years before 2001.   8 
Tessoriero  (2004)  suggests  that  these  price  moderations  reflect  firms’  efforts  to  limit 
political support for campaign platforms that include pharmaceutical price regulations. 
The relative growth of U.S. pharmaceutical prices continues to be a political flashpoint, 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative real pharmaceutical price inflation for the EU and U.S., with base year 
of 1986 = 1, computed by dividing the pharmaceutical price index by the consumer price 




                                                 
4 A search of the Wall Street Journal for articles that discussed average pharmaceutical price inflation 
compared to consumer price inflation produces only three articles from 1984 until 1992. Between 1992 and 
1993, 12 such articles appeared, and from 1994 through 2005, 42 articles appeared.  
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3. EU versus U.S. Pharmaceutical Firms’ Profitability, Stock Returns, and R&D  
 
  Given the EU’s restrictive price regulations, one would expect EU firms to be 
more negatively affected than U.S. firms because proportionately more of their revenue is 
likely to come from the EU. Unfortunately, few firms report comprehensive data on the 
geographic distribution of firm sales. Compustat Segments database includes sales by 
geographic area for firms that report it in their financial statements after 1997. Between 
1998 and 2004, 43 (13) U.S. (EU) firms report separate U.S. and EU sales. These data 
cover only about 40 percent of the firms in our sample. Nevertheless, they show that on 
average U.S. (EU) firms generated 76 (53) percent of combined U.S. plus EU sales from 
the U.S.  This proportion is stable across years for the U.S. firms, with 76 percent in both 
1998 and 2004, and only slight variations in other years. But the proportion for EU firms 
increases consistently from 43 percent in 1998, to 57 percent in 2004. This illustrates how 
EU firms’ sales have recently shifted toward the U.S., perhaps because the U.S. offered 
better pricing than the EU during the period. 
  Table 1 shows how EU firms’ profitability and R&D spending compares with that 
of U.S. firms. To be included in this analysis, a firm had to have at least five years of data 
in the Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial database between 1993 and 2004 (1993 
is the first year available on the database). In addition, the firm must have sales equal to 
at  least  ten  percent  of  its  assets.  Because  this  study  focuses  on  the  effects  of  price 
regulation on firm sales and R&D spending, we require that a firm has a minimal amount 
of product sales.
5 This condition is also important because each firm’s sales sensitivity to 
                                                 
5 These filters tend to eliminate small and young firms with few sales. Because the following results are 
size-weighted, including these firms has little effect on the results.    10 
EU  and  U.S.  price  indexes  must  be  estimated.  All  figures  are  translated  into  dollar 
amounts using Compustat’s Currency database. 
Profitability is measured by operating income standardized by total firm assets 
and  the  intensity  of  firm  R&D  is  measured  by  R&D  spending  divided  by  total  firm 
assets.
6 For each year, each firm’s profitability and R&D intensity is computed, and a 
weighted average is calculated for U.S. and EU firms, respectively. The weight placed on 
each U.S. (EU) firm’s profitability or R&D intensity equals the ratio of its total assets to 
the total assets of all U.S. (EU) firms with data in the particular year. 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of EU and U.S. Firms’ Profitability and R&D Spending from 1993 to 2004 
      Number of Firms    Oper. Inc./ Total Assets            R&D / Total Assets 
Year                 
  U.S.  EU    U.S.  EU    U.S.  EU 
                 
1993  77  15    0.193  0.113    0.100  0.084 
1994  93  19    0.165  0.108    0.083  0.080 
1995  110  20    0.167  0.122    0.090  0.090 
1996  120  24    0.173  0.130    0.093  0.083 
1997  133  28    0.179  0.120    0.100  0.076 
1998  143  30    0.179  0.136    0.104  0.089 
1999  132  35    0.190  0.100    0.099  0.079 
2000  112  38    0.193  0.107    0.098  0.091 
2001  113  38    0.175  0.112    0.107  0.086 
2002  112  37    0.166  0.122    0.100  0.099 
2003  104  32    0.134  0.148    0.095  0.103 
2004  96  30    0.135  0.144    0.085  0.107 
 
 
  Table 1 shows that U.S. firms are more profitable than EU firms in each year 
except  2003  and  2004.  For  the  1993-2004  period,  U.S.  firms  averaged  17.1  percent 
                                                 
6 We follow Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) who use assets to standardize R&D. Using sales to 
standardize does not materially change the results.   11 
profitability compared to 12.2 percent for EU firms. The 4.9 percentage point difference 
is highly significant using a two-tailed t-test (t-stat = 6.85). U.S. firms have greater R&D 
intensity in all years except 1995, 2003 and 2004. For the 1993-2004 period, U.S. firms 
averaged  9.6  percent  R&D  intensity  compared  to  8.9  percent  for  EU  firms.  The  0.7 
percent difference is significantly different from zero using a two-tailed t-test (t-stat = 
2.07).  
These results show that U.S. firms surpass EU firms in average profitability and 
R&D intensity, although this changed in 2003-2004. U.S. firms’ profitability has dropped 
while  that  of  EU  firms  has  increased,  perhaps  because  U.S.  firms  suppressed  price 
increases  leading  up  to  the  2004  elections,  or  because  they  faced  increasing  price 
pressures from generic medicines and increased reimportation. This is consistent with 
Figure 1 that shows that real pharmaceutical prices were flat in the U.S. during 2003-
2004, but increased in the EU.  
These measures are standardized by size (total assets). How do U.S. and EU firms 
compare in terms of aggregate figures? Table 2 shows that U.S. firms have grown assets 
and R&D spending faster than EU firms. Between 1993 and 2004, EU firms’ assets more 
than doubled but U.S. firms’ more than quadrupled. U.S. R&D spending has grown 3.7 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Total Assets and R&D Spending for EU and U.S. Firms from 1993 to 
2004 
     Number of Firms    Total Assets (Billions $)       R&D Spending (Billions $)  
Year                 
  U.S.  EU    U.S.  EU    U.S.  EU 
                 
1993  77  15    105.3  98.1    10.6  8.3 
1994  93  19    139.6  127.5    11.5  10.2 
1995  110  20    161.2  145.0    14.4  13.1 
1996  120  24    173.2  175.0    16.2  14.5 
1997  133  28    181.8  177.5    18.2  13.4 
1998  143  30    211.8  168.2    22.0  14.7 
1999  132  35    232.7  215.7    23.1  17.1 
2000  112  38    246.6  216.7    24.2  19.7 
2001  113  38    297.1  226.1    31.7  19.5 
2002  112  37    333.6  237.2    33.3  23.6 
2003  104  32    426.2  261.8    40.6  26.8 
2004  96  30    467.7  255.3    39.6  27.4 
 
The  U.S.  and  EU  samples  change  year-to-year  as  new  public  firms  enter  the 
industry and others liquidate or merge.
7 To the extent that other sample firms purchase 
these firms, the totals remain reasonable measures of total assets and R&D spending. Of 
course, the geographic location of assets and R&D are not necessarily consistent with 
these figures if there has been a relative switch from EU to U.S. for EU firms or vise 
versa. We will consider this issue in the next section. 
                                                 
7 The Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial data used for this table contains some errors that we have 
corrected. The errors were contained in the EU firms’ data, perhaps because Compustat’s U.S. database has 
been available for many years (since 1950) and its foreign portion of the Global database is relatively new 
(since 1993). Figures for Aventis between 1999 and 2003 needed to be multiplied by 1000, as did 
AstraZeneca’s figures for 1997. R&D figures for GlaxoSmithkline between 1993 and 1995 and Novo-
Nordisk in 1993 were incorrect due to typographical errors. All of these were changed based upon figures 
found in the firms’ annual reports. Finally, the very large merger between Sanofi and Aventis in 2004 
posed a unique problem. Instead of Compustat figures , which reflected merger-related accounting, we 
simply used the firms’ combined 2003 figures for the combined firm in 2004. This likely understates the 
true figures somewhat, but because the firm book a very large intangible asset to reflect the premium paid 
for the merger, the reported figures are large enough to cause the EU totals to be substantially overstated.    13 
  Another way to consider the effects of EU price regulation is to examine stock 
return performance for EU firms compared to U.S. firms. Doukas and Switzer (1992) 
show  that  stock  prices  respond  favorably  to  R&D  spending.  If  EU  firms  are  not 
comparatively  disadvantaged  by  price  regulation,  then  EU  and  U.S.  pharmaceutical 
stocks should perform comparably over time. Performance is measured by cumulative 
total  and  risk-adjusted  returns  between  1993  and  2004  for  market-value-weighed 
portfolios of EU and U.S. stocks (for the same samples used in Tables 1 and 2). For each 
full  year of data available for a firm, its annual return is computed using prices and 
dividends taken from Compustat’s Global Issues database. All prices and dividends are 
translated into dollars using Compustat’s Global Currency database. Then for each year, 
each EU firm’s return is weighted by its equity market value divided by the total equity 
market  value  of  all  EU  firms  with  returns  in  that  year.  These  weighted  returns  are 
summed for each year, and then the weighted-average returns are cumulated over the 
1993  to  2004  period.  Cumulative  total  returns  for  the  portfolio  of  U.S.  firms  are 
computed in the same way.  
  Because the risk of EU and U.S. pharmaceutical stocks could differ, differences in 
total returns could be due to risk differences. Therefore, we consider risk-adjusted returns 
as well. The following single factor market model is used to estimate the annual risk-
adjusted returns for each firm. 
 
  Rit = ￿i + ￿iRmt + ￿it ,                (1) 
 
where Rit  is firm i’s stock return in year t, Rmt is the market return in year t represented 
by the value-weighted Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index (dollar return),   14 
￿i and ￿i are ordinary least squares coefficients for firm i, and ￿it is the error term for firm 
i in year t. 
  Model 1 is estimated for each firm using its available annual returns. Then its 
risk-adjusted return (RARi,t) in year t is computed using estimates of ￿i  and ￿i,t from (1) 
as; 
 
  t i i t i RAR , , ˆ ˆ e a + = .                (2) 
 
Like total returns, risk-adjusted returns are value-weighted and cumulated over 1993 to 
2004 for portfolios of EU and U.S. firms’ stocks, respectively. The cumulative total and 
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 Fig. 2. Total Dollar-Denominated Returns and Risk-Adjusted Returns for Market-Value 
Weighted Portfolios of U.S. and EU Pharmaceutical Stocks for 1993-2004 
 
Figure  2  helps  illustrate  the  effects  of  price  controls  on  pharmaceutical  stock 
prices.  Between  1993  and  1997,  U.S.  and  EU  pharmaceutical  stocks  performed 
comparably. This is consistent with the pattern in the price indexes, which was flat for 
both the U.S. and the EU. U.S. prices rise in 1998 and 1999, while EU price remain flat. 
This is also when U.S. stocks start to outperform EU stocks on a total return and risk-
adjusted return basis. U.S. stocks maintain or expand their performance lead up until 
2004, when EU stocks narrow the gap. Note that 2004 is also when the EU price index 
increases substantially more than the U.S. index.  
  Looking back at Table 2, one can see a similar pattern in R&D spending, where 
U.S. firms substantially increase R&D spending compared to EU firms in 1998, but the 
reverse occurs in 2004. After computing the difference in the U.S. and EU price indexes, 
we  related  these  figures  to  the  differences  between  U.S.  and  EU  stock  returns.  The 
correlation over 1993-2004 between the U.S.-EU price index differences and the total 
return  (risk-adjusted)  differences  is  0.93  (0.94),  highly  statistically  significant.  The 
correlation between U.S.-EU pharmaceutical price change differences and U.S.-EU R&D 
intensity  differences  is  0.64,  also  statistically  significant.  U.S.-EU  R&D  intensity 
differences are also significantly related to U.S.-EU profitability differences (correlation 
is 0.82). 
Although attributing causality is always difficult, these correlations support an 
association  between  pharmaceutical  price  control  differences  and  R&D  spending   16 
differences.  And  these  R&D  spending  differences  appear  to  lead  to  stock  return 
differences, consistent with Doukas and Switzer (1992) findings. Indeed, the levels of 
returns are high for both U.S. and EU pharmaceutical stock, perhaps because they both 
spend heavily on R&D. But when pharmaceutical prices expand faster for one geographic 
area, firms in that area tend to spend more on R&D, and their stocks benefit.  
 
4. U.S.-EU R&D Growth Differences  
 
  A  weakness  of  the  Compustat  Global  data  is  that  it  includes  only  publicly 
reported data. Another problem is that firms report total R&D spending, not spending by 
geographic  area.  Finally,  total  R&D  spending  can  include  R&D  spent  by  non-
pharmaceutical divisions of the firm (although most produce primarily pharmaceuticals). 
  Two other data sources avoid these potential problems. The European Federation 
of  Pharmaceutical  Industries  and  Associations  (EFPIA)  has  collected  European  R&D 
spending  data  from  its  members  since  1986.
8  The  Pharmaceutical  Research  and 
Manufacturers of  America (PhRMA) has  collected U.S. R&D spending data from its 
members since 1970.  
These two associations include most major pharmaceutical firms (both U.S. and 
EU  firms),  hence,  their  data  provides  a  reasonable  picture  of  pharmaceutical  R&D 
spending in the U.S. and EU. They provide aggregate data only. For privacy reasons, they 
do not release firm-level data. The advantage of the data is that EFPIA’s (PhRMA’s) 
members report not only their total R&D, but also their EU-specific (U.S.-specific) R&D. 
                                                 
8 EFPIA member association include those in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.   17 
Furthermore, EFPIA translates R&D figures reported by its members from their domestic 
currencies into Euros. We convert the Euro figures to dollars. 
Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude and the timing of changes in pharmaceutical 
R&D spending in Europe and the U.S. R&D spending in Europe exceeded U.S. spending 
by about 24 percent in 1986 ($4790 vs $3875), but by 2004, European spending trailed 
U.S. spending by about 15 percent ($26725 vs. $30644). U.S. R&D spending does not 
outgrow European spending in every year, however. For example, in 1994 and 1995, 
European R&D growth exceeds U.S. growth (perhaps due to the Clinton administration’s 
































Fig. 3. EU and U.S. Pharmaceutical R&D Spending in Millions of Dollars for the Years 
from 1986 to 2004 
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Like Table 2, Figure 3 shows that EU R&D spending stalls in 1997 and 2001. 
U.S. R&D spending grows throughout the period including in 2004. Table 2 shows a 
decline in 2004 U.S. R&D spending. At least part of the explanation for the differences 
between figures in Table 2 and Figure 3 is that there are shifts in R&D spending from the 
EU to the U.S., or vice versa.  
There  is  anecdotal  evidence  that  EU  firms  have  recently  shifted  some  R&D 
spending from the EU to the U.S. Consider that in 1990, European firms spent 73 percent 
of their R&D in Europe and 26 percent in the U.S. By 2002, they spent 58 percent in 
Europe and 34 percent in the U.S.
9 Major European firms have moved their research or 
operational  headquarters  to  the  U.S.,  including  Pharmacia  in  1995,  Aventis  in  1999, 
GlaxoSmithKline in 2000, and Novartis in 2002. Reasons given for these moves include 
growing U.S. sales compared to EU sales, and requirements that they perform clinical 
trials  in  the  U.S.,  particularly  FDA  phase  three  trials.  U.S.-based  trials  also  establish 
relationships  with  top  U.S.  physicians  who  set  prescription  guidelines  for  other 
physicians.  
  Firms may be affected in different ways and at different times, but we argue that 
EU price regulations have had substantial cumulative effects. One case where public data 
is available illustrates the direct connection between regulation and EU R&D spending. 
Spain and France set a price for Bayer’s second best-selling drug (Adalat) 40 percent 
below  its  price  in  England.  When  Bayer  restricted  supply  to  French  and  Spanish 
wholesalers  who  were  reselling  their  supplies  in  England,  the  European  Commission 
fined Bayer 3 million Euros in 1996, and ordered them to stop restricting supply. World-
wide sales of Adalat, which had been growing strongly, subsequently fell by four (three) 
                                                 
9 EFPIA, “Year in Review 2001-2002.”   19 
percent in 1998 (1999), mostly due to French and Spanish wholesalers reselling Adalat at 
relatively low prices. As a consequence, Bayer cut its European R&D spending by one 
percent in 1998 and by 14 percent in 1999. Conversely, Bayer increased its U.S. R&D 
spending by eight percent in 1998 and by 31 percent in 1999.
10  Bayer may have expected 
the U.S. legal system to better protect their rights to control product distribution. 
  Some U.S. government data on foreign firms’ pharmaceutical R&D spending in 
the U.S. shows that their spending grew from $6.2 billion in 1999 to $7.9 billion in 2003. 
Conversely, U.S. firms foreign pharmaceutical R&D grew from only $2.8 billion in 1999 
to $3.2 billion in 2002.
11 The R&D data are not broken down by country but the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis reports U.S. pharmaceutical assets held by foreign firms broken 
down by country. European nations accounted for between 80 and 90 percent of these 
assets during 1999-2003.  
These data show that foreign firms do much more pharmaceutical R&D spending 
in the U.S. than U.S. firms do abroad. Furthermore, foreign firms’ U.S. R&D is growing 
faster. Therefore, Table 2 shows a smaller difference between U.S. and EU R&D than 
Figure 3 because the table does not pick up the fact that EU firms spend a much larger 
portion of their R&D in the U.S. than U.S. firms spend in the EU.  
  One problem with comparing figures adjusted for exchange rates is that exchange 
rates  can  change  significantly  year-to-year,  distorting  the  relative  growth  in  R&D  in 
                                                 
10 Figures taken from Bayer annual financial reports 1997-2001.  
11 The data on foreign firms’ U.S. pharmaceutical R&D spending comes from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. See “Selected Data by Industry” under Foreign Direst Investment in the U.S.: Financial and 
Operating Data for U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Multinational Companies 
(www.bea.gov/bea/di/di1fdiop.htm). The data on assets can be found at the same place under “Assets by 
Industry and Country. These data are available starting in 1999. The data on U.S. firms’ foreign 
pharmaceutical R&D spending comes from tables titled “Company R&D Performed Outside the United 
States by Industry” at www.nsf.gov/statistics/iris. Data for 2002 is the latest available. 
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particular  years.  Perhaps  a  better  way  to  compare  the  relative  progress  of  U.S.  and 
European R&D spending is to construct real growth rates for each series in dollars and 
Euros, respectively, and ignore exchange rates. Over a long period, relative changes in 
exchange  rates  will  appear  in  relative  inflation  rates  so  that  adjusting  nominal  R&D 
growth rates for domestic inflation provides smoother, more comparable series.  
  Figure  4  shows  the  smoothed  time  paths  of  R&D  growth,  making  trends  and 
average differences clearer. It plots the average annual compound real R&D spending 
growth rates for the U.S. and Europe. The growth rates are based on the same PhRMA 
and EFPIA data, except that EU figures remain in Euros. Real growth is nominal growth 
deflated by the CPI percent change for the same year. Each year’s observation is the 
average annual real R&D growth for the years up to and including that year. The figure 
highlights two significant features of the data. First, both U.S. and EU R&D spending 
growth rates are trending down. The average real growth rates for the first five years of 
the period compared to the last five years were 9.9% versus 7.6% for the U.S., and 6.6% 
versus 2.8% for Europe. This could be due to the effects of increasing political pressures 
in the U.S. and regulatory pressures in the EU.  










































































































Fig. 4. Average Annual Real Growth in U.S. and EU Pharmaceutical R&D Spending 
between 1987 and 2004 
 
Second, U.S. growth consistently exceeds European growth by an average of 3.4 
percentage points per year over the full 1987 to 2004 period. Over long periods of time 
such as this, there can be considerable cumulative effects of spending differences on the 
number of new pharmaceutical products developed in the EU versus the U. S. Indeed, 
EFPIA  reports  that  between  1987  and  1991,  European  firms  introduced  101  new 
medicines while U.S. firms introduced 54. But between 2000 and 2004, European firms 
introduced 57 new medicines while U.S. firms introduced 70.
12  
 
                                                 
12 See EFPIA “The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures,” 2005, and “Year in Review 2001-2002,” 2002.   22 
5. Linking Real Pharmaceutical Price Inflation to Firms’ R&D Spending 
  
We wish to test the cross-sectional relation between EU price regulations and 
R&D spending at the firm-level. Real pharmaceutical prices are used as a proxy for the 
effects of price regulations and political pressure in the U.S. and EU over time. Giaccotto, 
Santere, and Vernon (2005) find a statistically significant positive relation between U.S. 
industry-level R&D spending and real U.S. pharmaceutical prices. We implement our test 
using a two-stage process. In the first stage, we estimate the following regression for each 
firm in our samples of U.S. and EU firms. 
 
(Sales/Assets)i,t = b0 + bi,1(U.S. Price index)t + bi,2(EU Price Index)t + ￿i,t ,    (3) 
 
where (Sales/Assets)i,t is the ratio of sales to total assets for firm i in year t, (U.S. Price 
index)t and (EU Price Index)t are the U.S. and EU real pharmaceutical price indexes in 
year t, respectively, ￿i,t is an error term for firm i in year t, and b0, b1, and b2 are ordinary 
least squares regression coefficients.  
  The regression coefficients bi,1 and bi,2 are used to measure the sensitivity of a 
firm’s sales to U.S. and EU price indexes, respectively. Firm sales are standardized by 
assets to account for firm size and currency differences. All else equal, faster real prices 
increases should increase sales faster than assets, assuming that real pharmaceutical price 
changes do not affect the real cost of production facilities. We expect firms whose sales 
are more sensitive to U.S. (EU) pharmaceutical prices to spend more (less) on R&D. To 
test this hypothesis, we use the following regression.   23 
 
(mean R&D/Assets)i = b0 + b1( 1 , ˆ
i b ) + b2( 2 , ˆ
i b ) + ￿i,           (4) 
 
where (mean R&D/Assets)i is the mean of firm i’s ratio of R&D spending to total assets 
over the years for which it has Compustat data between 1993 to 2004,  1 , ˆ
i b  and  2 , ˆ
i b are 
coefficient estimates from (3) that measure firm i’s sales sensitivity to U.S. and EU price 
indexes,  respectively,  b0,  b1,  and  b2  are  coefficients,  and  ￿i  is  an  error  term.  The 
hypothesis implies that b1> 0 and b2 < 0. That is, the more sensitive a firm’s sales are to 
the U.S. (EU) price index, the greater its R&D spending.
13     
Table  3  reports  the  regression  results.  Note  that  both  U.S.  and  EU  firms  are 
pooled  for  this  analysis.  As  predicted,  1 ˆ b >  0  and  2 ˆ b <  0.  These  estimates  support  a 
significant positive (negative) relation between a firm’s sales sensitivity to U.S. (EU) real 







                                                 
13 Because the independent variables ( 1 , ˆ
i b  and  2 , ˆ
i b ) are measured with error, the estimates of  ￿1 and ￿2 
could be biased. Greene (1990) shows that when one independent variable is measured with error, its 
estimate is biased toward zero, but when more than one independent variable is measured with error, the 
bias depends on a number of parameters. To the extent that the estimates are biased toward zero, the tests 
for statistical significance are conservative.  
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        Table 3 
The Relation between Firm R&D Spending and Firm Sales Sensitivity to U.S. and EU 





   
 
Intercept 
U.S.  Price 
Sensitivity 
        b1 
EU  Price 
Sensitivity 
       b2 
 





     0.24 
(13.40) 
   0.12** 
  (2.02) 
  -0.10* 
  (3.92) 
       0.08      7.74* 
*(**) Statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level. Sample size is 181 firms. 
 
 
6. EU Price Regulation and the Long-term Costs of Slower R&D Spending 
 
In this section we estimate the potential costs of European-style pharmaceutical 
price regulations in terms of foregone new medicines and research jobs. We rely on the 
R&D growth figures observed in Figure 4. Both U.S. and EU R&D spending are growing 
slower,  with  EU  spending  growing  comparatively  slower  than  U.S.  spending. 
Consequently, the total of U.S. and EU new medicines introduced fell from 155 between 
1987 and 1991, to 127 between 2000 and 2004. This illustrates that while EU firms are 
most affected by EU regulations, U.S. firms are also affected. U.S. political pressure 
probably affects both groups as well. Indeed, six of the 21 firms that agreed to constrain 
their prices in response to Clinton’s proposed Health Security Act were EU firms.  
Vernon (2005) provides a detailed quasi-structural model and robust empirical 
model of pharmaceutical R&D investment that shows that European-like pharmaceutical 
regulation in the U.S. would lead to a one-time R&D decline of between 23.4 and 32.7   25 
percent. Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon (2005) found similar one-time effects using a 
very  different  estimation  method.  But  rather  than  a  one-time  decline,  R&D  spending 
would  likely  grow  slower  as  stricter  regulations  are  adopted  over  time.  Even  at  low 
prices,  some  relatively-promising  new  R&D  projects  and  late-stage  projects  would 
continue to be funded. 
  We analyze the impact of R&D growth declines with three related models. The 
models are used to compute the present value of R&D expenditures under different R&D 
growth assumptions. They  provide  estimates of cumulative effects on  R&D spending 
over  various  time  periods.  The  first  is  used  to  model  an  R&D  growth  drop  from  its 










+ ,                  (5) 
 
where RDt+1 is pharmaceutical R&D spending in year t+1, PVRDt is the present value of 
future  pharmaceutical  R&D  spending,  k  is  the  discount  rate  associated  with  R&D 
spending flows, and g is the constant future growth of R&D spending.  
  The second model is used to evaluate and compare R&D spending over shorter 
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where gs is the short-term growth in R&D spending from year t through year n,  
The third model covers a long time period but assumes that growth falls to a 






































  ,        (7) 
 
where RDn+t+1 is R&D spending in year n+t+1, and gL is the long-term growth in R&D 
spending starting in year n+t+1 and continuing forever.  
  We use the real growth rates observed in the data above for these models. The 
Appendix shows how Vernon’s (2005) one-time R&D spending decline relates to R&D 
growth declines. Estimates of  the real discount rate (k) for pharmaceutical industry cash 
flows are found in DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003), Myers and Shyam-Sunder 
(1996), and Grabowski and Vernon (1990) and range from nine to 11 percent. We will 
use a ten percent rate in the following analysis.  
  We estimate the costs of slower real R&D spending growth in terms of the present 
value of real R&D spending foregone, and then translate real R&D foregone into fewer 
new medicines and scientists employed. To translate real R&D spending foregone into 
new medicines foregone, we use two estimates of the present value of R&D cost per new 
medicine. The first estimate reported in DiMasi, Hansen, Grabowski, and Lasagna (1991) 
of about $114 million in 1987 dollars ($108.6 in 1985 dollars) is used to estimate new 
medicines  foregone  by  the  EU  during  our  sample  period  of  1986-2004.  The  second 
estimate reported in DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003) of about $403 million in   27 
2000 dollars ($439 million in 2004 dollars) is used to estimate new medicines foregone 
by the EU and the U.S. for all future years.  
To  translate  real  R&D  spending  foregone  into  pharmaceutical  scientist  jobs 
foregone, we use National Science Foundation figures that show R&D expenditures per 
R&D employee in the Pharmaceuticals and Medicine Manufacturing industry (NAICS 
3254) was $225,693 in 2001 (in constant 1996 dollars).
14 The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reports that medical scientists in the industry earned about $77,000 in wages ($36.92 per 
hour median wage).
15 Given that other compensation is likely to be at least half the cost 
of wages, then total employee compensation is about half of the $225,693 spent on R&D 
per R&D employee. We use $112,846 (in 1996 dollars) in the computations below.
16 
Table  4  presents  estimated  costs  of  EU-type  regulation  under  three  different 
scenarios. First are the costs to the EU of price regulation already incurred during the 
1986-2004  period.  Model  (6)  is  used  in  this  case.  The  second  and  third  are  the 
prospective costs to the EU and the U.S. of price regulation in the future. Models (5) and 




                                                 
14 See Industrial R&D Employment in the United States and in U.S. Multinational Corporations, National 
Science Foundation, 2004. 
15 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Pharmaceutical and Medical Manufacturing (NAICS 3254), 2004, 
(www.bls.gov/oco/cg/pdf/cgs009.pdf). 
16 Data on the distribution of R&D expenditures in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries across 
labor and non-labor inputs is not typically available in firms’ financial statements.  We searched the 
financial statements filed on the SEC’s EDGAR database for those that discussed their labor inputs, and 
labor was mentioned as at least a majority of R&D expenses. We conducted a limited analysis of “pure 
play” biotechnology firms with R&D expenditure and labor expense data listed on Compustat. These firms 
had little or no revenue from marketed products so they were solely research firms. Under reasonable 
assumptions about the distribution of labor expense between R&D and non-R&D employees, labor 
represents close to 90 percent of their R&D expenses.   28 
          Table 4 
Estimated  Costs  of  EU-Type  Pharmaceutical  Price  Regulation  in  Terms  of  Foregone 
R&D Spending, Fewer New Medicines, and Fewer Scientists Employed 
Scenario         Foregone  
        R&D  
     Spending 
    Foregone  
       New  
    Medicines 
    Foregone  
       R&D 
    Job Years* 
(1) 
Costs  Incurred  by  the  EU 
during  1986-2004  due  to 
real  R&D  growth  at  5.4% 
instead of 6.6% 
   




        46 
 
     31,925 
(2) 
Prospective  Costs  to  EU 
from  2004  onward  due  to 
real  R&D  growth  at  2.8% 
instead of 5.4% 
   
$280.78  Billion 
(2004 dollars) 
 
       526 
 
   1,035,953 
(3) 
Prospective  Costs  to  U.S. 
from  2004  onward  due  to 
real  R&D  growth  at  5.4% 
for  18  years  followed  by 
2.8%  thereafter  instead  of 
6.6% throughout 






       974 
 
 
   1,578,081 
*Uses  CPI  annual  inflation  rates  to  adjust  $112,846  (1996  dollars) 




For  the  first  scenario,  foregone  European  R&D  spending  is  estimated  by 
comparing PVRD calculated using Europe’s actual 1987-2004 annual real R&D growth 
(5.4%), to PVRD assuming that EU growth of 6.6% between 1987 and 1991 could have 
been maintained if regulations were more comparable to the U.S. Note that U.S. annual 
real R&D growth during the period averaged considerably more; about 8.8 percent. Some 
of that growth probably reflects a shift of R&D spending by EU firms from the EU to the   29 
U.S.  Given  this,  a  6.6  percent  EU  growth  under  U.S.-type  pricing  condition  seems 
reasonable. 
The costs for this scenario are $4.96 billion EU R&D foregone during 1986-2004, 
which would have produced 46 new medicines and 31,925 job years. This is equivalent to 
1680 EU research jobs for the 19 years. These figures are reasonable in light of the fact 
that EU firms actually introduced 101 new medicines between 1987 and 1991, but 44 less 
between 2000 and 2004. Of course, one could argue that some of the EU R&D spending 
foregone was partly reallocated and spent in the U.S. Indeed, for the same comparison 
periods, the U.S. experienced an increase of 16 new products. Assuming that these were 
derived from R&D spending transferred from Europe still leaves 28 foregone medicines 
on net for the five years. Extrapolating over the 19 year period, this is equivalent to about 
106  foregone  new  medicines.  Hence  46  new  medicines  foregone  could  be  an 
underestimate. 
The  second  scenario  estimates  future  long-term  foregone  European  R&D 
spending by comparing PVRD calculated using Europe’s most recent five-year (2000-
2004) average annual real R&D growth (2.8%), to PVRD assuming average EU growth 
over 1986-2004 (5.4%). Costs for this scenario, of course, are much larger because the 
growth  difference  is  larger  and  all  future  years  are  covered.  Forgone  future  R&D  is 
estimated at $280.78 billion in 2004 dollars. This is equivalent to 526 new medicines 
foregone and 1,035,953 lost job years.  
The  third  scenario  estimates  future  long-term  foregone  U.S.  R&D  spending. 
Assuming  that  the  U.S.  adopts  EU-type  price  regulation  gradually  over  the  19  years 
starting in 2005, we project that U.S. real growth will be comparable to the EU’s 5.4   30 
percent average real growth rate during 1986-2004. After 19 years, the same long-term 
real growth rate assumed for the EU (2.8%) is adopted for the U.S. PVRD based upon 
this  two-stage  growth  decline  is  compared  to  PVRD  estimated  using  a  constant  6.6 
percent future growth rate. Forgone future R&D is estimated at $427.40 billion in 2004 
dollars. This is equivalent to 974 new medicines foregone and 1,578,081 lost job years.  
Costs estimated in scenarios two and three may seem large, but they represent 
annual R&D growth rate declines of only a few percentage points at most. The gradual 
accumulation of costs may not produce the political response that a large one-time drop 
of 20-30 percent would cause. But the growing gap between EU and U.S. pharmaceutical 
R&D, and the movement of R&D facilities to the U.S. by EU firms, should be a signal to 




  This paper illustrates how the gap between U.S. and European pharmaceutical 
R&D spending has changed over the 19 years from 1986 through 2004. Europe outspent 
the U.S. by about 24 percent in 1986, but by 2004, the U.S. was outspending Europe by 
about 15 percent. From 2000 to 2004, U.S. spending grew at a 6.6% rate compared to 
2.8% for Europe. If this growth difference persists for another five years, U.S. R&D 
spending will exceed Europe’s by 37%. 
  The implicit cost in terms of new medicines foregone is large. If European R&D 
spending had grown at 6.6% over the last 19 years instead of its actual 5.4% rate, about 
46 new medicines would have been produced. R&D growth has trended down for both   31 
the  U.S.  and  Europe,  but  the  gap  in  growth  rates  between  the  U.S.  and  Europe  has 
remained quite stable at about 3.4 percent. The general downward trend could reflect 
weaker real price increases in the U.S. since 1992 and no real price increase in Europe 
throughout. Threatened or actual pharmaceutical price regulation could account for this 
weaker price growth and, consequently, weaker R&D growth.  
Slower R&D growth as a consequence of price regulation and reimportation may 
be politically acceptable because current consumer benefit, but we show that the cost to 
future generations is substantial. European-type policies adopted in the U.S. could lead to 
974  fewer  new  medicines  and  1,578,081  lost  job  years  in  the  future.  Because  new 
medicines improve health and extend lives (see Lichtenberg 1996, 2003), these policies 
essentially trade off the health and employment opportunities of future generations for 
cost savings for current pharmaceutical consumers.    32 
Appendix 
 
  Vernon’s  (2005)  one-time  decline  of  between  23.4  and  32.7  percent  in  R&D 
spending due to European-like regulation might seem large, but model (5) can be used to 
show that a relatively small R&D growth rate decline can produce the same result. To see 
this,  use  (5)  assuming  a  one-time  drop  in  R&D  spending  of  ￿  and  equate  it  to  (5) 
assuming a decrease in R&D spending growth of ￿. 
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Table 1A 
Proportional Change (￿) in Real U.S. R&D Growth Rate Equivalent to a One-time 30 
Percent Decrease in R&D Spending Due to European-like Price Regulation 
 
 
Real Discount Rate 
Expected Future U.S. R&D 
Pharmaceutical Real Growth Rate 
  6%  7%  8% 
9%  0.21  0.12  0.05 
10%  0.29  0.18  0.11 
11%  0.36  0.24  0.16 
 
Assuming a one-time R&D spending decrease of 30%, Table 1A shows that the 
equivalent change in R&D spending growth is proportionately smaller in all cases except 
for one. The average value of ￿ is 18 percent. For example, this means that if expected 
real R&D spending growth is 7% and the real discount rate is 10%, then European-like 
price regulation would decrease growth from 7% to 5.7%. Given that European real R&D 
spending growth fell from 6.6% to 2.8% during 1987 to 2004, Vernon’s predicted one-
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